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
SUBJECT: Preliminary Thoughts on the Soviet Build-up in Cube

We must allow four major possibilities re Soviet motivation in establishing an offensive missile capability in Cuba:

- 1. The Soviets have had in mind gaining a physical military advantage over the US that would put them in a good, or at least better, position to press the US to reach settlement ff various problems — of which Serlin would be the most important but hardly the last — on Soviet terms. In connection with this possibility:
- The Soviet line since 1957 has been that the US must accept as a fact of lief a shift in the world power balance in figure of the USSR. As long as the stasile gap, etc., was accepted by the UB, Moscow was apparently satisfied that it could increasingly capitalise on this line in crisis confrontations with the US. But the trend in the US from the summer of 1961 in the way of both an accelerated build-up of our own military capability and a downgrading of Soviet strength in comparison with our own has knocked the ground from under Soviet calculations. The Soviets have consequently needed quickly to redress the balance and at the same time to convince the US that it had been redressed, or more than redressed. Otherviase Moscow could have only decreasing hope of holding up in a continuing struggle against the US. (The US and not they would be operating from a growing position of strength.)
- There has been evidence of a forced draft Soviet military effort at least since last fall; renewal of tasting; a succession of decisions indicating an increased resourceallocations to the military despite admitted heavy costs to other pressing programs (i.e., no increase in investments in agriculture; food price rises; curtailment of housing constructions; etc.); a spectacular revival of intense activity in space over the part several months; the second round of testing; and the nevly amountained section of rockst tests in the Pacific.
- capability in Cuba, and [medium range]bombers, would fit into such a forced draft Soviet effort. Either one of two considerations may have been governing; (a) Moscow may have estimated that toolong would be

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The strength of the mount enough ICSH strength to intinidate the strength to the telefactor the UE) and hence it faced urgant need to work out any game passed penting the US under the same sort of direct threat of intermediate range missiles that now hange over Western Europe, and as early and cheeply as possible (NB what has reportedly gone into Cuba consists of items that the USSH has in great quantity) or (b) the Cuban capability may be intended as only one step in a series that Moscow calculates will convince the US that an impossible gap exists between US and Soviet capability. If this last should be correct we should look for what Moscow might expect to be a surprise in connection with further molest rests, or, especially, in connection with the forth-coming Facilit missile shots. We should also be alert to an early epace spectacular.


It is important to recall that beginning in the spring a buil set in in Moscow's prosecution of its foreign policy objectives. While this may have been due to indesicion, the possibility was nated at the time that Moscow might be marking time pending some sort of important gain in the military sphere.

decision to establish a missile capability had to be reached at least four months and probably six or more months ago, i.e, at the time when the Soviets were in the midst of present their general military buildoup and when the marked lull prevailed in the prosecution of their objectives.

2. The second possibility is that the Soviets have had in mind achieving a military position that would enable them to engage with maximum chance of success in a final military shoodown with the US. The Cuban build-up would fit into this shheme in the same vay it would fit into a scheme that had the more limited objective of securing a stronger military base from which to operate. i.e., it would if gotten away with give the Soviete at relatively small direct cost an important added capability against the US. No concrete or inferential evidence exists that this is estually the Soviet intention. It must be accepted as an important speculative possibility, however, since we cannot now, any maximum is the past, rule out completely a Soviet resort to force in the substantial way, given either an estimate of a decisive military adjusted to the stronger of a decisive military adjusted to the second of the contest was going hopelessly

the cold war and has chosen Cuba as a point of departuse. The US would be expected to react to Cuba in such a way as to give the Soviets an

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comments and a serious move or densent in royare to Barlin, or even Turking Read or ease other area where the US has a foreign base; or the US might be expected to so concentrate its attention on Cuba that it would prove unable to reast effectively to some other origin. This possibility, like the foregoing, would require a Soviet residence to take risks to the point of extreme brinkmenship. We have no evidence that the Soviets are prepared to take such risks; but we again cannot rule out the possibility for the simple reason that it presents a danger that we cannot afford to ignore.

4. A fourth possibility is that the Soviets have in mind simply another move in the chase game of the cold war. In connection with this possibility:


- Cuba fell into the Soviet lap without particular effects or costs on Moscow's part. Events moved in a way, however, which ease heavily to engage both Soviet resources and prestige. At the same three? the Castro regime showed itself plieble to the Soviet will and the demonstrated a clear uncillinguess to get itself directly involved in a move to get rid of the regime. The USSE and the Satellites: were able to meterinto Cube in a vey and to an extent that might well have suggested almost no limit to possibilities. Thus the Blos largely took over the economy, the administrative atructure, and the military establishment. With the Cubens having velocmed, and the US having tolerated, Soviet military savieurs and probably some operational personnie, Soviet tasks, and up-to-date Soviet combat aircraft, Moscow may have reasoned that it could take the next logical step and safely make Cuba into a base that would give it a omnorete presence at a strategic point in the western besisphere. It could draw advantage from this in its dealings with the US, exploiting its muisance value if nothing else. Specifically, the Soviets might expect to capitalise on the Cuben base either through trading it off in a "deal" with the US re Berlin or some of our other bases, or to secure a commitment on our part to oppose a muslear capability for the West Germans; or they might expect it to have a sobering effect on us in connection with our over-all stance on negotiations.

Beauty might, on the other hand, consider the base acquisition as a materially, but not immediately important move in the contest for Letter famelia. Even a further spread of revolution in Letin America, it would be me added factor deterring US counter-action. In this commerciae, it should be recalled that kinushchev has voiced, with seeming conviction, faith that with Soviet power what it is, US leaders will not dare to use force to prevent or undo any particular communist advance that does not itself involve a direct use of force on the part of one of the

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"sectable countries". The US would like to resort to "counter reveletionary estivities" against such advances, but since it knows that this will lead to war it will be afraid in any given instance to do so.

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1. Which of the four objectives the Soviets may have had in mind, it would seem essential from the standpoint of US interests that the Cuban missile capability be eliminated as quickly and decisively as possible. We should be equally concerned not to allow Moscow to less frog at such slight cost the disadvantage deriving from the lag in their ICBM capability, to give them an added military advantage if they intend either an over-all military confrontation or to heat up the cold war, or to conseds them more or less gratuitously something which they did not previously have with which to drive hard bargains with we.

While risks would certainly exist in case of our forcefully liquidating the capability, it seems likely now as it has seemed likely in the past that the Soriets will not get themselves involved in a war over Cuba, or any other particular issue, that they are met ready for general reasons to undertake. Hence if it is to be a matter of war, we can expect to face the issue over some other issue if Cuba does not produce the result.

2. Beyond this, at this stage in the East-Wast struggle it is vital that the Soviets not be allowed a success of the magnitude that an effective base on Cubs would represent. The Soviet decision to establish the base, involving the risks that it clearly does, suggests more an act of desperation than enything else. If Moscow gets away with it, the result will doubtless be a definite reduction in pressures operating on it, both internally, (s.g. the arms racs) and internationally. It would at the same time increase our own defense problems and adversely affect our prestige. It would, in other words, constitute a ridiculously cheap but highly important tour de force on Moscow's part.

Bore it should be stressed that the Cuben dayslopment is not parallel to that we have done in Turkey, Western Europe or elsewhere, but the what wells be represented by our establishing a base in Finland or even Hangary.

As Soviet success in their Cuban venture would vive the Soviets a big power and psychological boost, its failure might prove of great

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importunce to our efforts to get the Soviet problem firmly under central. If, as can be well argued, this is a watershed period for get the USE — a time of great decision re whether to continue or backtrack in pursuit of child war objectives, alsowing this particular door might prove decisive. This, I think, is what we ought to keep uppermost in mind when we consider courses of action. I would think our stance should surely and finally be that the base is not permissible or negotiable.

